Reject Science, Beat Your Wife?

Posted on May 10, 2016 by Ryren Cadora

Given a situation where science contradicts religion, who is more likely to fall into the trap of cognitive dissonance and say, “Damn the science! Damn the evidence! My religion is true!”? There are a lot of variables that determine how we respond to such contradictions, and I could build a model that captures many of them, but that’s not very fun, and to be honest—the question I ask is not scientifically interesting. That being stated…

The other day I received a huge (~750 mb) dataset from World Values Survey. It contains numerical data for questions asked to respondents all over the world about sociopolitical positions. There are over 1,000 questions, and I’ve spent a short while trying to get intimately familiar with them. Throughout my perusal I’ve come across some questions that pique my interest. I decided to build a logit model in Stata, which tests probabilities of the dependent variable.

I want to get some administrative issues out of the way first. This is not a scientific study. You, the reader, are my peer reviewer. I performed no post-regression analysis to determine if the model fits the data. And I’m deeply aware that because the data ranges from 1981 to ~2014, it likely suffers from some kind of serial correlation. Do not take this experiment as gospel.

The Model Variables

  • DV: RelSci_Conflict: Whenever science and religion conflict, religion is always right
    • Binary variable
    • 0: Disagree, 1: Agree
  • IV1: SexB4Marriage: Justifiable: Sex before marriage
    • 1 through 10
    • 1 = Never Justifiable, 10 = Always Justifiable
  • IV2: Prostitute: Justifiable: prostitution
    • 1 through 10
    • 1 = Never Justifiable, 10 = Always Justifiable
  • IV3: Beat_Wife:Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife
    • 1 through 10
    • 1 = Never Justifiable, 10 = Always Justifiable
  • IV4: Homosexuality: Justifiable: homosexuality
    • 1 through 10
    • 1 = Never Justifiable, 10 = Always Justifiable

Results

Refer to the table below:

rel-sci-logit.jpg

First, we can throw Prostitute out of the model. There’s no significant statistical relationship between justifying prostitution and rejecting science in favor of religion.

But this model does suggest that the more we justify sex before marriage, the less likely we are to reject science if it contradicts our religions. The same is true for justifying homosexuality. The more we justify homosexuality, the less likely we are to reject science. But those are obvious. Religion teaches us that sex before marriage and homosexuality are wrong. So it makes sense that the more we reject the teachings of religious texts, the less likely we are to support religion if evidence comes along to contradict it. So let’s look at that other variable.

The coefficient for beat_wife is striking (no pun intended)! The more someone justifies spousal abuse, the more probable it is they will agree that religious teachings must be believed despite contradictory scientific evidence. It’s not a small effect either. If I convert that into odds, it’s four to one that someone who justifies spousal abuse will reject science. To make better sense of this here’s a graph showing the relationship.

beatwife-sci.jpg

As you can see, justifying spousal abuse and rejecting science go hand-in-hand.

To be honest I thought this would not have had such an effect. I was surprised because views on domestic violence are largely secular and dependent on other social and legislative/judicial factors. But then I remembered: Religious books are rife with justifications for and duty towards domestic violence. Furthermore, women are generally subservient to men in many Jewish, Hindu, Christian, and Islamic sects. So on further contemplation, it’s no surprise that people who think beating their wives is okay are more likely to cling to their religions when science tells us their religions are wrong.

As I stated earlier this experiment is not scientific, meaning it probably suffers from a lot of problems associated with early models, which should give some religious folk a get-out-of-cognitive-dissonance-jail-free card after reading this. But do me a favor, if you believe both that religion always trumps science and that it’s okay to beat your wife, you need to make a serious change to your worldview.

I’ll let you slide for rejecting science, but domestic violence is unforgivable. Don’t expect the same level of patience from me for spousal abuse.

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When Merely Mentioning ISIS is Offensive

Posted on May 1, 2016 by Ryren Cadora

About six weeks ago I gave a presentation on ontological insecurity, cognitive dissonance, and prophetic violence carried out by the Islamic State. It was an informal setting; several pizzas adorned a round table, and the audience had as much talking time as I. Several members of the university’s Islamic Center came, eager to defend their faith when the focus was on terrorism. Knowing who half my audience was in advance I tailored my discussion to be as sensitive as possible. Unfortunately, merely discussing the Islamic State puts some people on the defensive.

My presentation went like this:

  • Define ISIS’s methodology (barbaric killings, etc.)
  • Define ISIS’s beliefs (the apocalypse is upon us)
  • Attempt to explain barbarism with two theories: ontological insecurity in a world hostile to its identity, and cognitive dissonance when a) their prophesies do not come true and b) when the world, including fellow Muslims, condemn them

I made it a point to discuss how about half of Muslims believe in the end times prophesies, and that I was making no judgements in my presentation about what ideas are good and what ideas are bad. I merely listed ISIS beliefs. I thought I did this in the most sensitive way possible, but many in the group took the mere mention of violence and beliefs in the same sentence as a personal insult.

One girl begged me to come to her mosque to speak with other Muslims (as if I implied that all Muslims believe violence is justified if it defends their beliefs). Another girl (who I found out is actually atheist, but is a staunch defender of her former faith) implored me to instead write a paper about how most Muslims are non-violent (but that’s not a very scientific paper). I was pleaded with from every angle, and none of those angles had anything to do with the content of my paper.

Remember, my paper attempts to explain why ISIS’s brand of violence exceeds the norm (even bin Laden was appalled when Zarqawi started cutting off the heads of innocent civilians). The paper had nothing to do with what Muslims believe, but rather the lengths to which a specific terror group is willing to go to protect its beliefs.

I felt this was unjustified, and I think future presentations should be more formal. I shouldn’t yield the floor to everyone with any opinion about any sentence in my paper.

Later I was approached by a human security professor, who was confused about the whole ordeal. She thought the presentation was professional and objective. The department head also talked to me, dismissing the hecklers as contributing nothing to the academic discussion about ISIS. Thankfully people in the field understood what I was trying to convey to the audience. So I can rest assured I did nothing wrong during the presentation.

I think this is an example of what happens when we privilege any idea at the same level as scientific ideas in the halls of higher learning. If I say “ISIS is violent, and here’s my explanation of why they’re violent…” retorting “Not all Muslims are violent” contributes nothing to our understanding of why ISIS is violent. “Yes, I know not all Muslims are violent. I’m not saying they are; I’m merely trying to explain why ISIS is violent!” I know some people feel the need to defend their faith, and that defense is understandable. But there’s a time and a place for defense… like when someone is actually attacking their faith.

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True Believers, Religion, Politics, and Willingness to Die

Posted on April 29, 2016 by Ryren Cadora

I’m currently working on some rather cool simulations, attempting to determine the conditions sufficient to cause mass rebellious movements, where being killed by your own government is preferable to living in the status quo. I’m referring to armed insurrection with the explicit intent to overthrow a regime, rather than everyday protest movements.

Because it’s summer time I asked a bunch of professors for books to read that will help me in my dissertation. The engineering professors suggested books like Agent_Zero by Joshua Epstein, and—believe me—that book is #2 on my list! But I need to have a theoretical background, bringing me back to the soft side of social science. The director of the International Studies department suggested The True Believer, Eric Hoffer’s most famous contribution to social psychology.

For you lovers of knowledge, the entire pdf of the book is here.

As soon as she sent me this pdf I read the preface to determine whether or not it was of any use to my research (yes, it is!). And just two paragraphs in something jumped out at me that I’ve known all along, but never really thought about. Per Hoffer:

All mass movements generate in their adherents a readiness to die and a proclivity for united action; all of them, irrespective of the doctrine they preach and the program they project, breed fanaticism, enthusiasm, fervent hope, hatred and intolerance; all of them are capable of releasing a powerful 􏰀flow of activity in certain departments of life; all of them demand blind faith and singlehearted allegiance.

And it doesn’t end there. Two paragraphs later:

He who, like Pascal, 􏰂finds precise reasons for the effectiveness of Christian doctrine has also found the reasons for the effectiveness of Communist, Nazi and nationalist doctrine. However different the holy causes people die for, they perhaps die basically for the same thing.

In other words, the willingness to die in defense of your own religion is no different—from a psychological perspective—than the willingness to die in defense of Adolph Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s Russia, or Donald Trump’s America.

Hoffer seems to suggest that in the minds of the true believer, all mass movements are of such significant import that religious movements are indistinguishable from secular movements. The problem is, however, that secular movements are usually more pliable than religious movements. Religious movements survive due to deep seated beliefs about morality and the afterlife according to an infallible supernatural agent; secular movements survive according to the will of the people. The willingness to die—and therefore kill—to defend religious ideas will survive over the willingness to die and kill to defend ideas that are constantly in flux.

Perhaps this is why religion lasts at the expense of secular ideas.

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Natural Selection and Computer Programs Appearing Simply by Chance

Posted on April 18, 2016 by Ryren Cadora

Last night this article by the Friendly Atheist came across my Twitter feed, discussing a Jehovah’s Witness Youtube video where scientist and JW Yaroslav Dovhanych argues that evolution is a myth. I’m not going to get into the details of his argument. The linked article by the Friendly Atheist and the video attached in the article already do that. Instead I’m going to discuss Dovhanych’s first premise—his setup to the rest of his argument—which is demonstrably false!

Per the article, Dovhanych pokes fun at evolution by stating:

Can anyone say that some computer programs appeared simply by chance?

Dovhanych implies that computer programs do not appear by chance. Another way of putting it is that new programs (or “species” of programs) are designed by an intelligent creator—chance has nothing to do with it.

This is almost always true, except, of course, when it’s not. It is demonstrably false to say that no computer programs appear by chance. You see, there is this little known method in operations management and agent-based modeling called “Genetic Algorithms.” A subset of this is called “evolutionary computation” and “genetic programming.” The results of this method are widespread. Usually it’s used to evolve the best solution to a complex problem. But every once it a while it’s been used to evolve a computer program that best solves the problem. It works like this (in simple, generalized, and long terms):

Take a few lines of code that represent simple random generations of solutions. Seed the population with a couple known good solutions. Apply a random initiation. A function then determines the relative ‘fitness’ of individual solutions. Decode the chromosome (line of code) to obtain the variable values (cut the chromosome into genes). Transform the raw evaluation into a fitness level between 0 and 1. Raw evaluation function of a problem usually involves some measure of good (ex. Profit) or detriment (ex. Cost). Deal with constraints (throw out infeasible solutions when they are created and recreated, assign infeasible solutions a value of 0, penalize the fitness of an individual by an amount in proportion to the degree of infeasibility, etc.). Apply a genetic operator, a set of methods that act on the individuals to pass on and/or change. Next is selection; strings (chromosomes) are selected to be passed on from one generation to the next. Finally comes crossover. Two chromosomes (lines of code) exchange information. We can repeat this multiple times, pulling in mutations (changing a single bit here and there) until a very large set of iterations produces the best solution to a problem.

This is a fairly complicated method for solving a problem, but it also works very well. And this process has also been used to naturally evolve new computer programs without human design. No intelligent design required! Examples and results of this kind of programming can be found here. Here is a source with a huge bibliography.

It’s one thing to not believe in evolution. It’s another thing to base your entire argument against evolution on a demonstrably incorrect premise. Dovhanych and his Jehovah’s Witness cohorts should take notice of the world around them. Computer programs can and do appear simply by chance.

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First Degree Murder as Self-Preservation: Religious Violence and Insecure Identity

Posted on April 10, 2016 by Ryren Cadora

Ask yourself the following questions: What is your identity? What is the most important part of your identity to a larger social group? To what lengths are you willing to go to preserve that identity (criticism of others or violence)?

The last question should give you insight into the language you use to discuss members of other social groups that do not share your identity (see Campbell, 1992). That is, the stronger our attachment to preserving our own identity, the stronger is our language to define the ‘other’s’ identity. Mr. Trump’s ‘rapist’ accusation against Mexican immigrants is a perfect example of this. By calling Mexicans rapists and criminals, Mr. Trump is actually 1) defining his own identity (as a non-rapist), 2) expressing the moral position of his own identity by contrasting it against others who do not share the same values, and 3) justifying the construction of enemies against his social group.

When identity becomes important enough, however, mere words no longer suffice. Armed conflict is always the product of disagreements over identity (Who has the moral high ground? Whose culture belongs where? Whose culture threatens our identity by engaging in acts our culture finds grossly repugnant?).

Slobodan Milosevic? Genocidal madman and Russian puppet. NATO intervention.

Osama bin Laden? Anti-Western, anti-democratic jihadist with intent to kill millions of Americans. International campaign to deliver democracy to Afghanistan.

Muammar Gaddafi? State sponsor of terrorism and illegitimate ruler. Several US-led campaigns over the course of ~30 years to topple his government.

When words are no longer appropriate tools to preserve our own identity, they become tools to justify international warfare. This is understandable. Every society throughout history that has waged a war with another society has escalated its language to the point where language validates violence. But all of my examples about violence have been states. What if we bring this down to the personal level?

Why do some Christians murder abortion doctors? Why do some Christians kill their atheist friends? Why are atheist bloggers hacked to death? Why do some Christians murder gay men?

Courts usually find some kind of motivation. It might be explicit; the accused was motivated by specific religious instructions. It might be implicit; the accused suffered some kind of mental illness. There are many excuses. I argue, on the other hand, that the reason is the self-preservation of identity (ontological security). When a condition is present that threatens the sense of self, some can justify violent countermeasures against the source of their ontological insecurity. The source is generally another person or group that holds values that counter their own. Previous rhetoric (see Trump) has constructed an ‘outsider’ who does not deserve to live in our society. Just like international conflicts, interpersonal conflicts are the results of identifying contrasting values and defining them as part of the ‘other,’ with which we vehemently disagree.

In other words, religious violence is not necessarily religiously justified. It is instead carried out by people who believe their identities are being threatened by the presence of an ‘other’ that does not hold the same values. This is apparent when we talk about peace anxiety (see Rumelili, 2014). The fact that two individuals or societies are at peace signals to one or the other (or both) that their identities have been diminished. Coexistence undermines the value of difference. Therefore, former conflicts will reformulate and persist. A religious man with extreme views that is tolerated by a liberal society will lash out at the society strictly for tolerating him because he feels tolerance belittles his identity.

I present you this alternative way of looking at religious conflict because traditional explanations (e.g. might = right, struggle over resources, precepts in religious text, etc.) might no longer be compelling enough. Religious violence might instead be a function of declining religious identity when faced with people who do not share your religious values.

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When Prophecy Succeeds?: The Islamic State Problem as an Imaginary Reality

Posted on April 5, 2016 by Ryren Cadora

The main point of this essay is that the Islamic State’s beliefs are so entrenched in its adherents’ identities that defeating them is all but an exercise in futility. There is no way to put the genie back in the bottle. Not diplomacy nor military counteraction nor anything else will stop the spread of barbarity, at least not in our generation. Because the Islamic State’s (IS) beliefs are proscriptive in terms of violence, its normative statements are also in terms of violence. Violence constructs and fulfills its own prophecies. The fulfillment of these prophecies drives IS towards more acts of violence in the quest to herald in the unfulfilled prophecies.

First, note that to make my argument I want to first look at these prophecies.

IS believes that the Mahdi will arrive and defeat the Antichrist after the restoration of the Caliphate. Because IS has created a so-called Caliphate, they believe the prophecy has been fulfilled, and the arrival of the Mahdi is imminent. Second, IS made prophecy that the restoration of Sharia over Dabiq would herald a coalition of Western non-believing invaders. IS captured Dabiq, fulfilling its prophecy. On the other hand IS appears oblivious to its role in self-fulfilling these prophecies. Nonetheless, these prophecies serve to reinforce knowledge that their beliefs are true.

IS has made other prophecies, which have not yet come true:

  • Adherents to movement will spread the Caliphate by killing nonbelievers
  • Mahdi and followers will sack Istanbul
  • Antichrist will arrive in Jerusalem
  • Jesus will return
  • Final battle between good and evil in Dabiq (likely with NATO)
  • This battle will result in IS victory, but at a great cost (only a few thousand remain)
  • Jesus will kill the Antichrist
  • Jesus will convert remaining nonbelievers
  • Creation of global Islamic utopia

Second, note the first prophecy, which argues that physical violence against non-believers is proscribed by prophecy. Without it the Caliphate cannot spread. Because IS believes this is a literal battle between good and evil, battlefield morality does not apply. This makes it incredibly difficult to predict IS behavior outside general ideas of violence.

Third, IS has been subjected to a slew of various criticisms: from military counteraction, Western media reports, and Sunni and Shia denunciation. This compels members to violence to prove their beliefs are not only valid, but also true. This becomes even easier when prophecy explicitly calls for violence against nonbelievers.

In this case the prophecy is violence; by hewing more to their beliefs, the adherent will respond to criticism that elucidates their cognitive dissonance by seeking to fulfill one of the above prophecies. Because most are contingent on supernatural phenomena outside the adherent’s abilities, and one is contingent on foreign armies, he will likely seek to spread the Caliphate by killing nonbelievers. By doing so he believes he is fulfilling prophecy, thus reinforcing his own beliefs.

In other words, IS has made predictions about the current and future state of the world. Its members wholeheartedly believe these predictions, and they are willing to use violence to defend them for two reasons: 1) the prophecies explicitly call for violence and 2) the world is full of condemnation against their beliefs and actions, creating cognitive discomfort; proving the prophecies true cures that discomfort.

Therefore—if I am correct—it would require an extraordinary amount of time and effort to change these beliefs. Perhaps building societies in terms of infrastructure, economies, access to health care, and legitimization of the Iraqi and Syrian states (by providing the former) will draw people away from IS and back to civilized society. I make no prescriptions because even that will require an astronomical amount of resources. Furthermore, determining what is in no way tells us what should be.

Finally, I will confess some problems with my argument. First, it assumes all members are in the group because they believe the prophecies. Some, particularly Baathists who joined its predecessor in Iraq (al Qaeda in Iraq), joined not for fame, glory, or religion; they joined because Prime Minister Maliki disenfranchised the Sunni population, leaving many of them removed from their official posts and unemployed. With nowhere else to turn many were forced into the Islamist group. This problem might be remedied with the idea I present in the previous paragraph; however, as I’ve stated, it’s almost impossible. Second, terrorist groups generally do not survive longer than a generation. With IS being ~15 years old (give or take), it could naturally self destruct in another decade in a half. This is supported in the literature.

Regardless, it’s my position that even if the group ceases to be in name, its ideas will live on, and people will be conducting terror missions on behalf of its prophecies for years to come.

I’ve drawn ideas for this essay from the following sources:

  • David Campbell – Writing Security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity (1998)
  • David Hume – A Treatise of Human Nature (1739)
  • Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart – Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (2011)
  • Leon Festinger – When Prophecy Fails: a social and psychological study of a modern group that predicted the destruction of the world (1956)
  • Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger – ISIS: The Terror State (2014)
  • William McCants – The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State (2015).
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Reform without Authority?

Posted on March 10, 2016 by Ryren Cadora

One of the problems—if you will—with Islam and why it is so difficult to reform is its lack of a central authority. Their prophet long dead and the Ottoman Caliphate long defunct, in the intervening years the closest we’ve come to a centralized authority in Islam with the power to reform is the pretender pretender Caliph of the Islamic State, an organization much maligned to the idea of reform. This hasn’t been a problem with Christianity; the Papal office has long served as an authority to rehabilitate itself according to evolving standards of decency.

But what about the vast numbers of Muslims who do not subscribe to old Islam, but rather subscribe to modern Islam with a reformed view of women and sexuality (the main points of contention between the West and Islam)?

This question has plagued me in some of my research. Using Spain (with a very long history of Muslim populations) as a case study, I am often reminded about reformed Islam when trying to make my case, which I will briefly lay out now.

In the last few decades Moroccan and Algerian immigrant populations in Spain have increased by 800%. During this same time Spanish citizens who believe religion plays no role in their day-to-day lives have increased from 42% to 67%, meaning Spain is becoming both more Islamic and more secular. And as ideas about sexuality and gender diverge between these two populations (the secular and the sectarian), cognitive dissonance forces the respective populations to clash, at least in terms of ideas. For the Muslim immigrant the following is likely to take place:

  1. The immigrant has deeply held convictions.
  2. His convictions have entrenched him in certain behaviors and actions in his home country that would be difficult to unlearn.
  3. His beliefs are specific enough to shape the real world in which he lives.
  4. But upon arrival to a country with fundamentally different social ideas, his beliefs are immediately contradicted, causing cognitive discomfort.
  5. Therefore, he seeks to mitigate his discomfort through a social support structure, usually a Mosque or Muslim community.

In essence, cognitive dissonance regarding competing ideas about sexuality and gender compel ideas to self-reinforce with each successive generation. Secular ideas become more secular faster, and traditional religious ideas secularize at a much slower pace, particularly because “[T]he jeering of non-believers simply makes it more difficult for the adherents to withdraw from the movement and admit they were wrong…” (Festinger). Muslim support structures act as a public audience that prevents many from turning away, even when presented with evidence. The clash of civilizations (with a sexual twist) will go on for generations to come.

So why then do we see so many secular Muslims in Western societies? Hell, even Lebanon (a predominantly Muslim country in the Levantine Middle East) is chock full of secular youth. I must confess that my model is by no means complete, even in regards to Spain alone, but it does represent reality at least to some small degree.

But perhaps I’m not completely wrong. Cognitive dissonance is a bitch for us old timers, but for children it is a tool for figuring out which ideas are best. Children might be better adept at secularizing by using their peers as social models. When cognitive dissonance makes them choose between their parent’s traditional beliefs and their friends’ modern beliefs, the threat of social estrangement is probably a compelling motivator to side with their Western peers.

I don’t know. I’ve been working on this for six months, and my model is getting far from parsimonious, which can be good and bad. I suppose this is all just some long-winded conversation we must have, but I very much believe cognitive dissonance is at the heart of it.

So the point is: Can Islam reform itself without a central authority by way of a growing secular youth? Or is it doomed to languish in the past for generations to come, even when the world grows up around it?

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Bible Contradictions Explained: Apologist Replies to My Series

Posted on March 6, 2016 by Ryren Cadora

I was recently contacted by a Christian apologist, asking permission if he could use the content of my list of bible contradictions in order to rebut them in Youtube videos. My interest was immediately piqued. Although I have probably abandoned the series, I was surprised because no one bothers to ask my permission to use anything on this site! Indeed, as has probably happened to many other bloggers, often my posts are stolen in toto without permission and posted to commercial websites, where the owners receive advertising revenue at my expense. So of course I said yes (he has not monetized his videos, but even if he had I would still let him use my material).

The video series in question can be found on Davids Goliath’s youtube channel. The series is titled “Bible Contradictions Explained,” and currently he has uploaded videos for the first three contradictions in the series.

To be honest to David, however, I hope he doesn’t expect to win me over as a convert, but I believe it’s important to engage in conversation with those whose beliefs are so divergent from mine. Besides, he might succeed in convincing me that a certain contradiction is not actually a contradiction at all. I’m interested in the truth, so this too is important to me.

Unfortunately, like I stated, I’ve moved on from the contradiction series to other things in my field, so I will not be responding to his rebuttals, but, like anyone who believes in dialogue should do, he has left open his comments section on his videos. Feel free to watch and offer him any feedback/criticisms/questions.

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Probability that Miracles Occur: A Bayesian Analysis

Posted on March 1, 2016 by Ryren Cadora

One of the most common statements by those professing to know that their interpretation of their specific religious book is true is the assertion that they have observed miracles. They claim that their uncle’s cancer remission is an act of god. Or maybe they claim divine intervention because their bible didn’t burn in a car fire. Or perhaps they see the image of Christ in the stucco wall of their neighbor’s house and proclaim “Miracle!” Whatever the observation they claim it rests on the assumption that they know some divine and supernatural agency was behind it.

Well, no. They have faith. But let’s assume they are 99% certain that the Virgin Mary appearing in toast is a full fledged miracle, leaving behind a mere 1% chance that they are wrong, which is fair—sometimes you gotta hedge your bets at least a little in case the toast turns out to be a fraud.

But that’s part of the point. Maybe it is a fraud. So how should rational people decide whether or not the toast is of divine origin? Bayes’ Theorem!

You might have seen this before on this blog, but if not (and if you aren’t familiar with it) the theorem states that:

 

bayestheorem.jpg

In other words, the Bayes’ Theorem calculates the probability of a hypothesis given the observation of new information. In this case I will be testing the probability that miracles occur given the observation of a perceived miracle.

Let H be the hypothesis: Miracles occur.
H’ is the alternate hypothesis: Miracles do not occur.
Let D be the datum: You have observed something that you perceive to be a miracle.
P(H): This is the prior probability that miracles occur (i.e. before you witness a “miracle”). We will set this at 0.001 (or about 1 in 1,000). Before you come at me, let’s be fair; this is being extraordinarily generous.
P(D|H): This is the probability that you observed a “miracle” given that miracles occur. I will be nice and set this at 0.99 (in other words 99% likelihood), which is in keeping with the beliefs in the second paragraph.
P(D|H’): This is the probability that you observed a “miracle” given that miracles do not occur. This is the false positive. I will set this to 0.01 (or 1%) [note that P(D|H) + P(D|H’) must add up to 1].

To sum:
P(H) = 0.001
P(D|H) = 0.99
P(D|H’) = 0.01

Now we can plug this all into the equation above and we come up with the following probability:

bayesmiracle.jpg

In other words if you see something you believe to be a miracle, the Bayes’ Theorem, using my very generous prior probabilities, says that the probability of that event being a miracle is about 9%, with odds 9 to 1 not in your favor.

Now remember that 9% isn’t saying much, considering how nice I was with the prior probability. Considering that in the whole of human history no event has ever occurred that has been verified as a true-to-god miracle under laboratory conditions, the prior probability is actually more like 0.000000001, or about 1 in a billion (and even that is still being generous)! If we plug this into our equation you are going to have to shift that decimal to the left quite a few times.

To sum up, if you see something you believe is a miracle, even with 99% certainty, just check the math. No matter how much you believe it was a true miracle, the probability just isn’t going to do you any favors come time to defend your beliefs. This is not to say you’re wrong—just probably wrong. Very, very probably wrong.

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